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ARE SECURITIES LAWS EFFECTIVE AGAINST 
CLIMATE CHANGE? A PROPOSAL FOR 
TARGETED CLIMATE RELATED DISCLOSURE 
AND GHG REDUCTION 
By Nate Chumley* 
ABSTRACT 
The New York Attorney General filed a lawsuit against Exxon Mobil 
on October 24, 2018, claiming the company committed securities 
fraud in order to prop up the value of the company by publicly 
disclosing a higher proxy cost—or projected future cost—of climate 
change regulation than the internal cost used. Following this lawsuit, 
a federal class action was filed utilizing the same legal theory on the 
same facts. These lawsuits should be viewed as part of the larger 
history of lawsuits against large fossil fuel companies for climate 
change-related harms. Public nuisance theory largely captured a set of 
lawsuits against these companies, before being nullified as an 
actionable federal claim by AEP and Kivalina on displacement 
grounds. 
There are several issues with using securities fraud to address climate 
change. First, securities laws suffer from circularity, as harmed 
investors are recouped by other stakeholders and the corporation, 
thereby also harming the shareholder group, and leaving no net gain. 
Second, quantifying proxy costs poses a challenge, as future 
regulations are not yet in existence. Third, climate change disclosure 
is not mandated by the SEC, which leads to a range of disclosure, often 
inadequate, from the use of varied accounting frameworks or the lack 
of disclosure entirely. Finally, securities law fails to address the 
societal cost of climate change, instead focusing on reimbursing the 
internal harmed shareholder group while excluding externally harmed 
groups. This Note proposes a legislative solution through comparison 
to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 as a societal-
focused law. Through the proposed legislation, this Note seeks to help 
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refine securities fraud as a tool to combat climate change-related 
financial fraud to capture negative externalities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The effects of climate change continue to worsen as the global rise 
in temperature approaches 1.5 degrees Celsius.1 The frequency and 
intensity of hurricanes, wild fires, droughts, heat waves, and other 
extreme weather events are increasing, while glacier melt and sea level 
rise continue unabated.2 Climate change has conclusively been attributed 
to anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.3 Recently, the 
Climate Accountability Institute reported that if fossil fuels continue to 
be extracted at the same rate over the next twenty-eight years as they were 
between 1988 and 2017, “global average temperatures would be on course 
to rise by 4 degrees Celsius . . . by the end of the century.”4 This 
temperature rise has dire consequences, including extensive “species 
extinction . . . and global food scarcity”5 risks. The report further 
calculated that one hundred companies are responsible for 71 percent of 
all global emissions.6 Exxon Mobil is responsible for 2 percent of all 
global GHG emissions from 1988–2010.7 This makes it the fifth highest 
emitting entity globally, and the first overall non-nation-state-owned 
company.8 It ranks behind a nation state, China, and three nationally 
owned oil and gas companies—Saudi Aramco, Gazprom, and National 
Iranian Oil Company.9 It is thus not surprising that Exxon Mobil and other 
large fossil fuel emitting companies have been the target of climate 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. See UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL 
REPORT GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 °C (2018), HTTPS://WWW.IPCC.CH/SR15/ 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/TJ4E-83S5]; DAVID REIDMILLER, U.S. GLOBAL RESEARCH 
PROGRAM, ET AL., NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT Ch. 2 (2018), 
https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/chapter/1/ [https://perma.cc/R5DS-C2V2] 
[hereinafter National Climate Assessment]. 
 2. National Climate Assessment, supra note 1, at 37. 
 3. See id. at 36, 39–40. 
 4. PAUL GRIFFIN, CDP CARBON MAJORS REPORT 2017 at 7 (2017), 
https://b8f65cb373b1b7b15febc70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.co
m/cms/reports/documents/000/002/327/original/Carbon-Majors-Report-
2017.pdf?1499691240 [https://perma.cc/L88V-B2AF] [hereinafter Carbon Majors]. 
 5. Id. at 7. 
 6. Id. at 8. 
 7. See id.; see also Tess Riley, Just 100 Fossil Fuel Companies Responsible for 
71% of Global Emissions, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 10, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
sustainable-business/2017/jul/10/100-fossil-fuel-companies-investors-responsible-71-
global-emissions-cdp-study-climate-change [https://perma.cc/VA73-HUVY]. 
 8. Carbon Majors, supra note 4, at 8. 
 9. Id. 
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change litigation. The use of securities laws for climate change litigation 
is, however, a relatively new phenomenon.10 
To understand the current use of the securities laws to address 
climate change, it is important to discuss the recent climate change 
litigation history. A decade prior to New York’s lawsuit, federal public 
nuisance theory was used against large fossil fuel companies.11 However, 
in 2011 and 2012, two rulings heralded the demise of federal public 
nuisance under the displacement theory.12 
The more recent phenomenon is the use of “proxy cost” in climate 
change securities disclosure litigation.13 Proxy cost is defined as the 
present financial cost of future governmental regulatory action.14 
According to New York’s lawsuit, it affects present day value of the 
company, including its investment decisions, business planning, assets, 
and estimates of future demand for oil and gas.15 New York’s lawsuit 
alleges differing internal and publicly represented proxy costs.16 
However, proxy cost suffers from the challenge of quantification, as the 
regulation nor its cost exist.17 
Scholars argue that securities litigation in general suffers from 
circular wealth transfers.18 They argue that when a secondary purchaser 
of securities successfully claims that the company has made false or 
misleading material representations causing an inflated purchase price, 
                                                                                                                                         
 10. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011); Native Vill. 
of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 11. Summons & Complaint at 17, People v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 452044/2018, 
2018 WL 5306631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018). 
 12. Am. Elec., 564 U.S. at 424; Native Vill., 696 F.3d. at 857 (stating that “[w]hen 
Congress has acted to occupy the entire field, that action displaces any previously 
available federal common law action”) (citation omitted). Displacement theory refers to 
when a federal statute addresses the same issue and offers a remedy for an overlapping 
federal common law right, therefore rendering the common law right void. 
 13. Summons & Complaint, supra note 11, at 27. 
 14. Id. (stating that “Exxon has repeatedly and falsely assured investors that it has 
taken active and consistent steps to protect the company’s value from the risk that climate 
change regulation poses to its business.”). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 27–28. 
 17. See Summons & Complaint supra, note 14, at 27. 
 18. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay 
on Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1556 (2006); see also 
Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 1487, 1502 (1996). 
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the shareholders—who are forced to bear the recovery—are usually 
innocent of any wrongdoing.19 In addition, “neither the defendant 
corporation nor its continuing shareholders ordinarily benefit from the 
plaintiffs’ purchases,” as they are sold on a secondary market.20 This 
occurs because the class is certified by the period in which the securities 
were bought, thereby leaving the rest of the shareholders to bear the brunt 
of the penalties brought against the corporation.21 If they remain 
shareholders, the harmed shareholder group is penalized, along with the 
corporation.22 
Thus, damages would not be adequately apportioned to address the 
external costs of climate change in a securities disclosure lawsuit.23 The 
cases brought by New York and the federal class in Ramirez are based on 
similar theory and facts, and both seek to reimburse the shareholders who 
purchased securities on the secondary market.24 Therefore, the outcome 
of the lawsuits effectuates a circular wealth transfer and inadequately 
addresses any externalized harm.25 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank”) serves to prevent and mitigate risks to the stability of the 
American financial system.26 Dodd-Frank was developed and passed as a 
response to the 2008 Recession, where the collapse of mortgage-backed 
securities triggered a bank liquidity crisis.27 This Note delves into the 
requirements for Significant Financial Institutions (SIFIs)—the largest 
financial institutions capable of causing systemic economic harm, and 
proposes new climate-related securities disclosure laws in order to 
remedy external, climate change-related harms. Specifically, this Note 
                                                                                                                                         
 19. Coffee, Jr., supra note 18, at 1556. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1557. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See Summons & Complaint at 95, People v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 
452044/2018, 2018 WL 5306631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018); Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 
334 F. Supp. 3d 832, 847 (N.D. Tex. 2018). 
 25. See generally id. 
 26. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5325(a)(1), 5365(a)(1) (2012). 
 27. The Act seeks to prevent the societal risks that come from the financial distress 
or failure of large, interconnected financial institutions, which include large scale job 
loss, foreclosure, and lack of ability to secure credit. Dealbook, Obama Moves to Limit 
‘Reckless Risk’ of Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2010/01/21/obama-moves-to-limit-reckless-risks-of-banks/?searchResultPosition=4 
[https://perma.cc/6QYM-XFUM]. 
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proposes using the SIFI “stress tests,” or periodic disclosure of liquidity 
and compliance, and the SIFI liquidity requirement itself, as models for 
the creation of a mandated environmental, societal, and governmental 
(ESG) reporting framework for climate change disclosure. The proposal 
also uses an extension of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
(SEC) “fair fund” authority under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sarbanes-
Oxley) as a legal basis to recoup societal losses from climate change. 
This Note assesses whether securities laws are an effective 
mechanism to combat climate change, with a focus on harm and remedies. 
Part II discusses the recent use of the federal and state securities laws in 
the climate change disclosure context, with a focus on the use of proxy 
cost. Part III centers on the challenge of quantifying future proxy cost and 
discusses the criticism of shareholder security fraud lawsuits as a circular 
wealth transfer. Part IV uses the SIFI regulation created under Dodd-
Frank as a tool of comparison to propose a new framework for climate 
change regulation that realizes external costs. 
I. THE RISE OF THE SECURITIES LAWS AS A MECHANISM TO COMBAT 
FRAUDULENT CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE 
A. FAILED PUBLIC NUISANCE ATTEMPTS 
Many climate change lawsuits against large fossil fuel-emitting 
companies used federal environmental statutes, like the Clean Air Act 
(CAA) or the National Environmental Policy Act, or federal common law 
tort public nuisance theory.28 Federal environmental statutes have limited 
remedies for private claimants,29 and the doctrine of displacement has 
effectively extinguished climate change claims under public nuisance 
theory.30 
In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the 
authority to regulate GHG emissions under the CAA, thereby displacing 
                                                                                                                                         
 28. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011); 
Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. 
ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d. 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 29. No private damages are available under the CAA. See Karine Peloffy, Kivalina 
v. Exxonmobil: A Comparative Case Comment, 9 MCGILL INT’L J. OF SUSTAINABLE DEV. 
L. AND POL’Y 119, 121, 127 (2012) (critiquing the Ninth Circuit’s application of the 
doctrine of displacement in Kivalina). 
 30. Am. Elec., 564 U.S. at 424; Kivalina, 696 F.3d. at 857. 
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any claim for injunctive relief under public nuisance theory for climate 
change.31 Shortly thereafter, in Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., the Ninth Circuit extended the displacement holding in American 
Electric to claims for monetary damages,32 even though the damages 
sought in Kivalina in this action were not available to it under the CAA.33 
Along with displacement, it is challenging to show prima facie 
climate change-caused damages.34 For example, in Kivalina, the District 
Court found there was no way to determine whether Exxon Mobil and the 
rest of the defendants’ emissions could be attributed to the plaintiff’s 
environmental damage suffered.35 
Ultimately, the current New York lawsuit was initiated to recoup 
investor loss.36 However, this Note assumes that New York State also 
seeks to combat the negative effects of climate change through securities 
litigation.37 
B. THE 2008 SETTLEMENT 
A decade before the current New York lawsuit against Exxon Mobil 
commenced, New York used the Martin Act to subpoena multiple utility 
and energy companies.38 The New York State Attorney General sought 
                                                                                                                                         
 31. See Am. Elec., 564 U.S. at 423–24. 
 32. Kivalina, 696 F.3d. at 857. 
 33. Peloffy, supra note 29, at 127. 
 34. Id. at 142. 
 35. Kivalina, 696 F.3d. at 868; see infra, Part II.B. It is argued that proxy costs 
potentially suffer from a similar causal disconnect. 
 36. Summons & Complaint at 95, People v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 452044/2018, 
2018 WL 5306631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018). 
 37. See Press Conference, Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. Att’y Gen., et al., A.G. 
Schneiderman, Former Vice President Al Gore and a Coalition of Attorneys General 
from Across the Country Announce Historic State-Based Effort to Combat Climate 
Change (Mar. 29, 2016), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-former-vice-
president-al-gore-and-coalition-attorneys-general-across [https://perma.cc/B4YY-
CZTM]. 
 38. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer & Danny Hakim, New York Subpoenas 5 Energy 
Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2007), http:// www.nytimes.com/ 
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information about whether these companies’ investors were receiving 
adequate information about the financial liabilities of carbon dioxide 
emissions, citing potentially misleading reporting.39 The investigations 
resulted in settlement agreements, most notably with two companies, 
Dynegy and Xcel.40 The settlements required the inclusion of material 
financial risks of GHG emissions in relation to climate change, including 
stranded or impaired assets.41 The 2008 settlements’ success likely played 
a role in the decision to initiate the current lawsuit against Exxon Mobil.42 
C. THE CURRENT LAWSUITS 
New York’s securities fraud lawsuit was filed against Exxon Mobil 
on October 24, 2018.43 The lawsuit is the culmination of more than two 
years of investigation under the Martin Act.44 The investigation 
commenced in November 2015, after articles from Inside Climate News 
and The Los Angeles Times alleged the company covered up its own 
                                                                                                                                         
2007/09/16/nyregion/16greenhouse.html [https://perma.cc/9CLJ-5EU8]; see also Rick 
E. Hansen, Climate Change Disclosure by SEC Registrants: Revisiting the SEC’s 2010 
Interpretive Release, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 487, 513–14 (2012); Kevin 
Poloncarz & Amy June, Bingham McCutchen LLP, New York Attorney General Reaches 
Major Settlements with Power Producers Regarding Disclosure of Risks of Climate 
Change (Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.martindale.com/environmental-law/article_ 
Bingham-McCutchen-LLP_581598.htm [https://perma.cc/3MNZ-2BVZ] (quoting the 
Xcel & Dynegy agreements). 
 39. See Hansen, supra, note 38, at 514. 
 40. See Poloncarz, supra note 38; see also Hansen, supra note 38, at 514. 
 41. See Hansen, supra note 38, at 514. 
 42. See generally Summons & Complaint, People v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 
452044/2018, 2018 WL 5306631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018). 
 43. Id. at 1; see also John S. Baker, Jr., Warning to Corporate Counsel: If State AGs 
Can Do This to ExxonMobil, How Safe is Your Company?, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
313, 314–15 (2017). 
 44. Justin Gillis & Clifford Krauss, ExxonMobil Investigated for Possible Climate 
Change Lies by New York Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/06/science/exxon-mobil-under-investigation-in-
new-york-over-climate-statements.html [https://perma.cc/T7GL-9VBM]. 
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climate change research for over thirty years.45 Eric Schneiderman—New 
York’s Attorney General at the time—initiated the investigation, alleging 
the company did not disclose its own conclusive knowledge of climate 
change to investors.46 
By summer 2017, Eric Schneiderman narrowed the scope of the 
investigation to focus on how Exxon Mobil had two separate financial 
calculations for the proxy cost of future regulatory action related to 
climate change: an internal, lower or non-existent proxy cost, and a 
publicly represented, higher proxy cost.47 
The lawsuit contains several allegations, most importantly, that 
Exxon Mobil failed to apply the proxy cost it represented to the public.48 
In its place, the company used a lower, undisclosed proxy cost contained 
in internal corporate guidance, a further lower cost based on a static 
number, accounting for existing regulations held flat for decades into the 
future, or no cost associated with GHG emissions.49 Additionally, in 
projecting demand for oil and gas, Exxon Mobil did not apply its public 
proxy cost to the transportation sector.50 It also did not apply proxy costs 
to its GHG emissions for long-term assets before 2016.51 
The federal class actions brought against Exxon Mobil by pension 
funds over the past two years rest on similar theories of proxy cost fraud.52 
Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp. alleges Exxon Mobil failed to disclose the 
actual proxy cost of carbon it used and failed to use when calculating 
                                                                                                                                         
 45. Neela Banerjee, et al., Exxon: The Road not Taken: Exxon Confirmed Global 
Warming Consensus in 1982 with In-House Climate Models, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS 
(Sept. 22, 2015), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/18092015/exxon-confirmedglobal-
warming-consensus-in-1982-with-in-house-climate-models [https://perma.cc/38YV-
L5UB]; Michael Hiltzik, A new study shows how Exxon Mobil downplayed climate 
change when it knew the problem was real, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-exxonmobil-20170822-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/V3NK-754Q]. 
 46. Gillis & Krauss, supra note 44. 
 47. Emily Flitter, NY Prosecutor Says Exxon Misled Investors on Climate Change, 
REUTERS (June 2, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-climatechange-exxon-
idUSL1N1IZ0O4 [https://perma.cc/Q4RE-WB5R]. 
 48. Summons & Complaint at 27, People v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 452044/2018, 
2018 WL 5306631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018). 
 49. Id. at 28. 
 50. Id. at 80. 
 51. Id. at 8. 
 52. Fentress v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 04 F. Supp. 3d 569, 576–80 (S.D. Tex. 2018); 
Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d 832, 847 (N.D. Tex. 2018). 
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capital expenditures and other business and investment decisions.53 
Although dismissed, Fentress v. Exxon Mobil Corp. alleged Exxon Mobil 
and several of its executives knew the prices of oil reserves and other 
assets were overvalued because it did not adequately address the known 
cost of climate change before writing them down.54 Part III.A. compares 
these lawsuits in further detail. 
II. CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE FRAUD SUITS ANALYZED: 
 DO THEY ACCOMPLISH THEIR GOAL? 
A. CAN PROXY COST BE TRUSTED? 
The outcome of Fentress demonstrates that securities fraud lawsuits 
based on proxy cost misstatements are challenging to prove in court.55 
The Southern District of Texas stated the price of future reserves were 
more likely to have been written down because the price of oil dropped 
precipitously.56 The Court also stated that competitors declared impaired 
reserves in 2014 through 2016, rather than realizing the failure to account 
for a more accurate future climate change regulatory cost.57 The Court 
also determined that even if Exxon Mobil did not effectively publicly 
divulge the climate change information, investors knew of the risks of 
climate change.58 Because publicly available information existed during 
the class period, the Court ruled the market incorporated this information 
into the price.59 
The Court also noted that because fossil fuels are likely to remain the 
majority of the global energy supply before 2040 based on information 
provided by the Energy Information Agency, allegations of stranded 
assets due to climate change regulation and the transition away from fossil 
fuels are “conclusory and inconsistent” with the reports.60 The Court 
concluded its analysis by stating that securities fraud did not provide a 
mechanism to address the questionable “ethical norms for a company to 
                                                                                                                                         
 53. Ramirez, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 846. 
 54. Fentress, 04 F. Supp. 3d at 580. 
 55. See generally id. at 587. 
 56. Id. at 573. 
 57. Id. at 579. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 578–79. 
 60. Id. at 578. 
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know that its business contributes to global harm and at the same time to 
expect to continue to profit from that business.”61 
The plaintiff pension fund in Ramirez used the same approach, yet 
focused on the exact communications proving a different internal cost 
used by the CEO and other executives, $40 per ton at 2030, as opposed to 
the publicly represented number, $80 per ton at 2040.62 The New York 
lawsuit alleges the same claims on the same facts as Ramirez.63 The 
internal communications suggest using a different internal cost of $40 per 
ton at 2030, as opposed to the publicly represented number, $60 per ton.64 
Although the plaintiff’s pension fund in Fentress alleged Exxon 
Mobil and its executives had a different internal proxy cost than the 
publicly stated price, in hindsight it failed to provide this specific proof.65 
The Court in Ramirez also did not raise the same findings denouncing the 
significance of proxy cost calculation, among other possible factors, into 
the devaluation of assets as the Fentress court.66 
Ultimately, proxy cost is a challenging metric, as it is difficult for 
courts to trust figures that quantify future regulatory cost.67 However, 
future regulatory action can be estimated by use of accurate accounting 
models.68 As evidenced in Ramirez, if there is sufficient evidence the 
company had two different public and internal figures for proxy cost, a 
prima facie showing of misrepresentation can be made.69 Proxy cost also 
presents a challenge as it relates to the requirement of materiality, which 
is what an investor might deem important before the sale or acquisition of 
a security.70 
                                                                                                                                         
 61. Id. at 579. 
 62. Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d 832, 846 (N.D. Tex. 2018); 
EXXON MOBIL, CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP REPORT 38 (2015), 
https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/~/media/Global/Files/sustainability-
report/publication/2015-ccr-full-digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4GV-SH2K]. 
 63. Summons & Complaint at 15, People v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 452044/2018, 
2018 WL 5306631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018). 
 64. Id. at 22. 
 65. See Ramirez, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 845–47. 
 66. See id.; see also Fentress v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 304 F. Supp. 3d 569, 576–80 
(S.D. Tex. 2018). 
 67. See Fentress, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 576–80. 
 68. About Us, GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL, https://ghgprotocol.org/about-us (last 
visited March 15, 2019) [https://perma.cc/CB9T-9DV3] [hereinafter GHG Protocol]. 
 69. See Ramirez, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 845–47. 
 70. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
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B. PROXY COST, ESG REPORTING, AND MATERIALITY 
In 2010, the SEC released an Interpretive Release that clarified the 
applicability of disclosing climate change proxy costs.71 Proxy costs are 
an aspect of the broader ESG required disclosure found in the 
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of a company’s 
SEC disclosure.72 Though the Interpretive Release did not impose new 
disclosure requirements or take a position on whether climate change 
exists, it indicated that the direct and indirect effects of climate change on 
a registrant’s business may be material73 to its investors and,74 therefore, 
require disclosure in the registrant’s SEC filings.75 The SEC 
acknowledged that local, state, federal, and international regulation of 
GHG emissions may require registrants to increase capital expenditures 
to reduce GHG emissions or incur expenses related to participation in 
regulatory schemes.76 The SEC further stated that registrants who may not 
be directly affected by such developments could still be indirectly and 
materially affected, for example, from changes in supply-chain prices.77 
In general, SEC disclosures require three types of material under 
SEC Rule S-K, which includes 10-Q quarterly reports and 10-K updates 
                                                                                                                                         
 71. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, COMMISSION GUIDANCE REGARDING 
DISCLOSURE RELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE, EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE NO. 61, 469, 75 
Fed. Reg. 6, 290 (Feb. 8, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WW5Y-VSFN] [hereinafter Interpretive Release]; see Hansen, supra 
note 38. 
 72. Kevin L. Doran & Elias L. Quinn, Climate Change Risk Disclosure: A Sector by 
Sector Analysis of SEC 10-K Filings from 1995-2008, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
721, 723 (2009); see Hansen, supra note 38, at 488. 
 73. A material fact, or materiality, means “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure 
of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable shareholder as having 
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” TSC Indus., 426 U.S. 
at 448 (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970)). 
 74. Federal law makes it illegal “[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or 
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j 
(2012). 
 75. Interpretive Release, supra note 71, at 6, 290–91; Hansen, supra note 38, at 488. 
 76. Interpretative Release, supra note 71, at 6, 291. 
 77. Id. 
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to quarterly reports.78 Item 103 requires disclosure of material pending 
legal proceedings and Item 303 mandates disclosure of management’s 
analysis of the financial condition and results of operations of the 
company, including the financial costs of future litigation, regulation, or 
legislation.79 To comply with Item 303, management must evaluate 
whether the pending legislation or regulation is reasonably likely to be 
enacted.80 Unless management determines that it is not reasonably likely 
to be enacted, it must proceed on the assumption that the legislation or 
regulation will be enacted.81 Second, management must determine 
whether the legislation or regulation, if enacted, is reasonably likely to 
have a material effect on the registrant, its financial condition or results 
of operations.82 Unless management determines that a material effect is 
not reasonably likely, MD&A disclosure is required.83 
Materiality is largely an economic-oriented analysis, as a reasonable 
shareholder invests for economic reasons.84 However, there is no 
generally accepted calculation or formula for determining materiality.85 
Both the SEC and courts have resisted any attempt to formulate a bright-
                                                                                                                                         
 78. Hansen, supra note 38, at 496–508; see also Constance Wagner, Corporate 
Environmental Reporting and Climate Change Risk: The Need for Reform of Securities 
and Exchange Commission Disclosure Rules, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 151, 
157–58 (2009). 
 79. Hansen, supra note 38, at 496–508. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See, e.g., Thomas Joo, Global Warming and the Management-Centered 
Corporation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 690 (2009) (“While carbon-impact 
information might be important to the buying and selling decisions of some, even many, 
environmentally concerned individuals, the legal standard is that of an objective 
‘reasonable shareholder,’ who is presumed to invest in order to make money.”). 
 85. See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 39 (2011) (rejecting 
statement that “adverse event reports that do not reveal a statistically significant increased 
risk of adverse events from product use are not material information”)(citation omitted); 
United States v. Basic, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) (rejecting bright-line test for 
materiality); Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 706, 717 (2d Cir. 2011) (rejecting 
bright-line tests for materiality and approving of SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99); 
SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 17 C.F.R. 211 (Aug. 19, 1999) (“[A] court must 
consider “both ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ factors in assessing an item’s materiality 
….”) [hereinafter SAB 99]. 
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line rule for materiality.86 In August 1999, the SEC issued Staff 
Accounting Bulletin No. 99, which acknowledged the practice of using 
thresholds to determine whether something would be material.87 The SEC 
acknowledged that the 5 percent materiality threshold is useful as a rough 
metric.88 This threshold, used by some registrants and auditors, means that 
a misstatement or omission that is below 5 percent of the company’s value 
would not be material, absent any other “egregious” conduct.89 However, 
the SEC warned against its exclusive reliance.90 
In addition, for contingent or future events, the probability of the 
event occurring must be weighed against the magnitude of the event.91 
This aspect of the materiality rule is important for assessing climate 
change, as its costs are largely intrinsic to the contingent nature of future 
events.92 Assessing magnitude requires some determination of the 
“degree of importance” of the development because “probability 
essentially requires a look into a crystal ball in an effort to determine the 
likelihood the development will occur.”93 Registrants have struggled and 
may continue to struggle with assessing the materiality of developments 
that may not be probable, but could have a significant impact on the issuer 
if they occurred.94 
C. SECURITIES LITIGATION AND CIRCULAR WEALTH TRANSFER 
Scholars believe that securities laws essentially transfer wealth from 
one set of shareholders to another.95 Professor John Coffee argues this 
circular transfer occurs when secondary purchasers of securities 
successfully sue.96 This wealth transfer occurs because the class is 
certified by the period in which the securities were bought, therefore 
leaving the rest of the shareholders to bear the brunt of the penalties 
                                                                                                                                         
 86. Litwin, 634 F.3d 706, 717 (rejecting bright-line tests for materiality and 
approving of SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99). 
 87. SAB 99, supra note 85. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988). 
 92. Hansen, supra note 38, at 496-508. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See, e.g, Coffee, Jr., supra note 18. 
 96. Coffee, Jr., supra note 18, at 1556. 
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against the corporation.97 Sometimes, shareholders will be in both the 
plaintiff class and the remaining shareholder class that bears the cost of 
the litigation.98 This is because the shareholders purchased stock before 
and during the class period.99 Therefore, these shareholders are making 
wealth transfers to themselves, minus the cost of litigation.100 
Large institutional investors are also making wealth transfers to 
themselves without any benefit.101 A large pension fund may hold several 
hundred stocks.102 Based on a calculation of the average amount of 
securities class action cases, the plaintiff class consists of the pension fund 
in half of all cases, and in the other half, it is the defendant class that 
constitutes the pension fund. 103 Therefore, the pension fund will only 
transfer wealth from one case to the next, without effectively gaining from 
the transfer.104 
Therefore, as Professor Coffee argues, the law should attempt to 
impose a greater share of securities class actions’ costs on the more 
culpable insiders rather than the company.105 He argues the most likely 
beneficiaries of the fraud are the insiders who sold at inflated prices.106 
However, securities lawsuits may include inside executives alongside the 
corporation as defendants, and insurance would cover the settlement or 
judgment amount.107 This presents a conflict of interest, as directors may 
want to settle their own liability with corporate funds.108 Therefore, the 
insiders who are most culpable escape personal liability in securities class 
actions through insurance and corporate monies.109 
                                                                                                                                         
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1558. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 1554. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1557–58. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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D. SECURITIES FRAUD AND SOCIETAL COST 
When it comes to how the securities laws quantify harm caused, 
there are varying perspectives.110 Some scholars raise the idea that the 
diversified investor is not harmed.111 Diversified investors may not really 
need compensation from litigation because they have diversified against 
the risk of securities violations.112 Institutional investors diversify their 
portfolios and change financial positions frequently.113 Therefore, the 
chance of being on the losing or winning side of a transaction when the 
stock price is distorted is essentially random.114 
Institutional investors may be overcompensated by litigation.115 
These investors will be compensated for losses through lawsuits, while 
innocent gains are not accounted for from occasionally being the 
advantaged party to fraud.116 
There is also a normative argument, where any fraudulent conduct 
should be morally condemned.117 There is a “societal need” to deter 
securities fraud because fraud itself is a harm done to the public.118 In 
many types of securities fraud—particularly civil securities fraud—the 
requirement of scienter reinforces the argument that the morally culpable 
individual should be punished.119 The origins of the securities laws 
evidence this phenomenon, as many were created after significant market 
downturns, such as the Great Depression and the Recession of 2008.120 
The courts have identified at least eight other separate policies 
underpinning securities fraud, most of which include costs to society and 
                                                                                                                                         
 110. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 611, 641 (1985); Jayme Herschkopf, Morality and Securities Fraud, 101 
MARQ. L. REV. 453, 467–68 (2017); Ann Morales Olazábal, Defining Recklessness: A 
Doctrinal Approach to Deterrence of Secondary Market Securities Fraud, 2010 WIS. L. 
REV. 1415, 1427–28; Coffee, Jr., supra note 18. 
 111. Easterbrook, supra note 110, at 641; Alexander, supra note 18, at 1502. 
 112. Alexander, supra note 18, at 1502. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Herschkopf, supra note 110, at 467–68; Olazábal, supra note 110, at 1427–28. 
 118. Olazabal, supra note 110, at 1427. 
 119. Herschkopf, supra note 110, at 468. 
 120. See id. at 476–79. 
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the markets.121 These include maintaining free securities markets, 
equalizing access to information, insuring equal bargaining strength, 
providing for disclosure, protecting investors, assuring fairness, building 
investor confidence, and deterring violations while compensating 
victims.122 
Many scholars ultimately agree that the societal impact of securities 
fraud rests on investor confidence and subsequent loss of capital.123 
Professor Coffee argues that the cumulative impact of the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals between 2000 and 2002 made stockholders wary, 
chilling the markets and causing investors to demand a higher return.124 
When the cost of capital increases, the economy suffers—and thus, 
society suffers as a result.125 Even smaller fraud cases may be aggregated, 
and therefore, it is argued, do affect the markets negatively.126 
The fundamental mechanism of securities laws is proper 
disclosure.127 Disclosure is an essential aspect of investor confidence.128 
When investors know what product they are receiving, and that the price 
is accurate, markets function more efficiently.129 The markets rely on trust 





 121. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 801, 806, 808 (5th Cir. 1970) (discussing free 
markets, fairness, disclosure, protecting investors, equal access, and equalization of 
bargaining position); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847–48, 851–52, 
855, 858, 860 (2d Cir. 1968) (mentioning fairness, equal access, deterrence, free markets, 
disclosure, and protecting the investing public). 
 122. Herpich, 430 F.2d at 801, 806, 808; Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 847–48, 
851–52, 855, 858, 860. 
 123. Coffee, supra note 18, at 1565–66. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (“The 1934 Act was designed 
to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices . . . . Underlying the adoption of 
extensive disclosure requirements was a legislative philosophy: There cannot be honest 
markets without honest publicity. Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market 
place thrive upon mystery and secrecy.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. Id. 
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E. SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER DODD-FRANK, 
SYSTEMICALLY FOCUSED REGULATION 
1. Scope 
Dodd-Frank was passed in 2010 with the goal of preventing and 
mitigating “risks to the stability of the financial system of the United 
States.”131 Dodd-Frank was developed and passed as a response to the 
2008 Recession, where the collapse of mortgage-backed securities, 
among other causes, triggered a bank liquidity crisis.132 Dodd-Frank seeks 
to prevent risks that could arise from the financial distress or failure of 
large interconnected financial institutions.133 It grants the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) the power to regulate the largest 
banks, which are those with more than $50 billion in assets.134 Dodd-
Frank also grants the power to regulate non-financial institutions that 
operate financial businesses that may significantly affect the financial 
markets based on the size and nature of the business.135 
2. Criteria 
There is no specific threshold that the FSOC has that would 
automatically include a company as a non-bank financial institution.136 
However, the FSOC looks to a list of factors that would indicate a need 
for enhanced regulatory oversight.137 The FSOC factors include: (a) the 
extent and nature of the transactions and relationships of the company 
with other significant nonbank financial companies and significant bank 
holding companies; (b) the importance of the company as a source of 
credit for households, businesses, and state and local governments and as 
a source of liquidity for the United States financial system; (c) the 
importance of the company as a source of credit for low-income, minority, 
                                                                                                                                         
 131. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5325, 5365(a)(1) (2012). 
 132. Binyamin Appelbaum & David Herszenhorn, Financial Overhaul Signals Shift 
on Deregulation, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/ 
business/16regulate.html [https://perma.cc/K4B4-Q3B6]; 12 U.S.C. §§ 5325, 5365(a)(1) 
(2012). 
 133. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5325, 5365(a)(1) (2012). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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or underserved communities, and the impact that the failure of such 
company would have on the availability of credit in such communities; 
and (d) the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, 
and mix of the activities of the company, among other factors.138 
As all administrative agencies are required to do, the FSOC must 
state with particularity how the regulatory body made its decision.139 This 
means the FSOC must state “what the actual [systemic financial] losses 
would be” if the corporation went into financial distress and “how the 
market would destabilize as a result.”140 Although the FSOC makes a 
predictive judgment, it must be based on reasoned predictions.141 The 
reasoning must also include an analysis of cost, where it must be 
“appropriate” and “risk-weighted,” considering systemic risk and 
insolvency risk compared to the regulatory cost imposed on the 
company.142 
3. Requirements Imposed 
Once a company is deemed a non-bank financial institution, the 
company must adhere to a list of standards imposed by the FSOC.143 The 
most important aspect of this regulation is the same requirement imposed 
on the regular SIFIs: nonbank financial institutions must maintain a debt 
to equity ratio of no more than 15 to 1.144 
Non-bank financial institutions are also prohibited from having 
credit exposure to any unaffiliated company that exceeds 25 percent of 
the capital stock and surplus.145 These companies may also be required to 
establish a risk committee that would be responsible for the oversight of 
the enterprise-wide risk management practices.146 Further regulations 
may be prescribed, including periodic public disclosures by non-bank 
                                                                                                                                         
 138. Id. 
 139. Metlife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219, 237 
(D.D.C. 2016). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 241. 
 143. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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financial institutions in order to support market evaluation of the risk 
profile, capital adequacy, and risk management capabilities.147 
Other requirements include potential intermediate holding company 
requirements, examinations of liquidity through stress tests, and enhanced 
reporting and information collection.148 In conducting its supervisory 
stress tests, the Federal Reserve calculates the projections of each firm’s 
balance sheet, risk-weighted assets, net income, and resulting regulatory 
capital ratios under these scenarios using data on firms’ financial 
conditions and risk characteristics provided by the firms and a set of 
models developed or selected by the Federal Reserve.149 
III. EXXON MOBIL AS SIGNIFICANT CARBON INSTITUTION? DODD-
FRANK INSPIRED REGULATION IN THE CLIMATE CHANGE ARENA 
The proposed regulation seeks to capture negative externalities 
associated with climate change, including harm to the economy and 
vulnerable populations. The proposal does so through a loose comparison 
to Dodd-Frank SIFI regulation. Much like Dodd-Frank’s SIFI regulation, 
this proposal seeks to capture negative externalities.150 Dodd-Frank’s SIFI 
regulation and the proposal seek to avoid large negative externalities 
through greater disclosure and targeted requirements. The proposal goes 
beyond proxy cost, to capture all climate change-related ESG reporting. 
The proposal, although a proposed federal regulation, also recommends 
to states to adopt a similar regulatory package. 
First, the proposal requires the SEC to implement an emissions 
reduction commitment for all disclosing companies, alongside a 
standardized reporting framework. The framework adopted is the Climate 
Change Reporting Framework (CCRF) created by the Climate Change 
Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB).151 To calculate GHG emissions, the 
proposal mandates the use of the Greenhouse Gas Protocol (GHG 
                                                                                                                                         
 147. Id. § 5365(j)(3). 
 148. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (2012). 
 149. U.S. FEDERAL RESERVE, DODD FRANK ACT STRESS TEST EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
(2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2018-june-dodd-frank-act-stress-
test-executive-summary.htm [https://perma.cc/Y7FX-V7MM]. 
 150. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2012); Appelbaum, supra note 132. 
 151. CLIMATE DISCLOSURE STANDARDS BOARD, CLIMATE CHANGE REPORTING 
FRAMEWORK—VERSION 1.1 (2012), https://www.cdsb.net/sites/cdsbnet/files/ 
cdsbframework_v1-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/32PR-X7EC]. 
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Protocol) accounting methodology.152 Transparent and comprehensive 
disclosure makes markets more efficient, as capital can be allocated to the 
best investments.153 On the contrary, financial fraud creates chilling 
effects on economic behavior and allows companies and their executives 
to enjoy inflated share values and its associated benefits.154 
Second, the proposal adopts a similar sanction framework as Dodd-
Frank.155 Dodd-Frank permits the FSOC to recommend participating 
agencies to force an over-leveraged, systemically compromising 
company to divest assets or dissolve.156 This proposal grants the SEC the 
asset divestiture power, but only as a last resort after a five-year grace 
period. The proposal first focuses on monetary penalties and increasing 
regulatory oversight in the event of non-compliance. 
Third, the proposal expands the available SEC remedies to use 
sanction funds to support climate change-related adaptation, mitigation, 
and cleanup efforts for communities most affected—especially lower-
income and disadvantaged groups. The proposal provides for EPA 
oversight of this program, given the agency is tasked with environmental 
regulatory oversight. Although this remedy goes beyond the traditional 
underpinnings of securities laws, as it is not “injured-shareholder-
centric,”157 providing benefit to non-shareholders of the defendant 
company, it furthers the fundamental legal goal of remedying harm 
caused. Through fraudulent conduct, companies obtain inflated value 
through material misstatements from climate change-causing business 
practices. 
Finally, the proposal recommends that the SEC and individual states 
pursue climate change securities fraud lawsuits as opposed to relying on 
private class actions to deter and remedy harmful conduct. Government 
use of securities fraud is a better tool than private class actions for 
remedying the external, societal costs of climate change.158 Private 
securities litigation, especially when secondary purchasers sue, creates a 
circular transfer, as plaintiff share classes obtain monetary remedy from 
                                                                                                                                         
 152. See GHG Protocol, supra note 68. 
 153. See supra Part II.D. 
 154. See supra Part II.D. 
 155. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2012). 
 156. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)(8) (2012). 
 157. Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887, 
1906 (2013). 
 158. See supra Part II.C. 
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the remaining stakeholders159 of the company.160 Government lawsuits 
can obtain civil and criminal damages, which can indirectly compensate 
the injured external, societal stakeholders.161 Furthermore, coupled with 
standardized, frequent disclosures, federal and state governments will 
ideally be able to bring more comprehensive cases to stop fraudulent 
activity. 
A. TRANSFER OF WEALTH FROM EXXON’S STAKEHOLDERS 
TO EXXON’S SHAREHOLDERS 
Securities litigation tends to create a circular wealth transfer when 
secondary purchasers sue for material misrepresentation against a 
corporation.162 Either the class is certified or the shareholder group is 
named in a public lawsuit by the period in which the securities were 
bought, therefore leaving the rest of the shareholders to bear the brunt of 
the penalties against the corporation.163 The transfer of wealth occurs from 
the stakeholder remainder group to the class shareholder group, even as 
this group is not the source of the harm.164 
In Ramirez and Fentress, both the plaintiff classes are pension funds, 
which are diversified, institutional investors.165 The pension fund group is 
one of many large investors comprising the pool of investors who own 
Exxon Mobil.166 The New York lawsuit essentially seeks the same 
damages as Ramirez and Fentress, albeit for a longer period and more 
diverse shareholder group, as all shareholders in that period are 
                                                                                                                                         
 159. “Stakeholders” is a term that traditionally refers to those individuals, other than 
shareholders, who have a stake in the success of a corporation, for example, labor, 
creditors, consumers, and the surrounding community. See Stakeholder, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (2d online ed.) https://thelawdictionary.org/stakeholders/ 
[https://perma.cc/FF8M-9ME3]. 
 160. See supra Part II.C. 
 161. See Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1025 (3d Cir. 1977); see also A.J. White 
& Co. v. SEC, 556 F.2d 619, 624 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 969 (1977). 
 162. See supra Part II.C. 
 163. Coffee, supra note 18, at 1557. 
 164. See supra Part II.C. 
 165. Fentress v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 304 F. Supp. 3d 569, 576-80 (S.D. Tex. 2018); 
Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d 832, 847 (N.D. Tex. 2018). 
 166. Ramirez, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 839. 
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included.167 The damages are the artificially inflated paid prices that 
would not have been if the information was publicly known.168 
Therefore, the climate change disclosure securities lawsuits, if 
successful, would transfer the court calculated disgorgement amount from 
the company to the shareholder group.169 This cost would effectively be 
imposed on the remaining stakeholder group, comprised of shareholders 
who were not in the lawsuit group, including executives, creditors, 
suppliers, employees, and other groups reliant on Exxon Mobil’s value.170 
This Note assumes, furthermore, that the New York lawsuit is largely 
motivated by the desire to effectuate a carbon-accountable and emission-
responsible society. Therefore, the circular and internalized remedy does 
not further its goal, apart from the element of deterrence.171 Funds are not 
transferred to the harmed external parties.172 
B. SCOPE 
When large financial institutions underleverage and a market 
downturn or significant financial loss occurs, causing insolvency and 
bankruptcy, catastrophic societal costs are borne.173 One large insolvency 
creates insolvencies for many other institutions.174 This leads to systemic 
job loss, inability to obtain credit for businesses and consumers alike, and 
foreclosures, among many other issues.175 Financial crises also affect 
vulnerable communities, including low-income, minority, and 
underserved populations.176 These communities are more likely to suffer 
from job loss, lack of credit, and foreclosure.177 The societal risk from 
underleveraging and risky financial behavior can be compared to the 
societal risk of climate-related disaster from the overconsumption of 
fossil fuels. 
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Overconsumption leads to overaccumulation of GHG emissions in 
the atmosphere, worsening the effects of climate change.178 The societal 
costs associated with climate change include loss of life, loss of habitable 
area, loss of private and public property, inadequate nutrition, and 
increased exposure to environmental toxins, among many others.179 These 
costs are due to sea-level rises, droughts, crop yield decreases, 
temperature increases, climate fluctuations, and severe weather events.180 
These societal costs harm the national economy by increasing the cost of 
healthcare, energy, essential items, and insurance, lowering corporate 
profits from stranded assets and damaged property.181 These costs also 
increase the financial burdens of municipalities and governments in 
adaptation, mitigation, and cleanup efforts, among many others.182 
Climate change particularly harms vulnerable communities.183 
Children, pregnant women, and the elderly are more sensitive to elevated 
levels of pollution, environmental toxins, and heat exposure.184 Lower-
income communities are more likely to be exposed to extreme heat, 
groundwater, and air pollution.185 The ability to perceive the risks to 
which the impoverished are exposed, their ability to respond to evacuation 
and emergency warnings, and their ability to relocate to a safer location 
is lower than other communities.186 Lower-income communities are also 
more likely to lack the financial ability to pay the costs associated with 
rebounding from a disaster.187 Additionally, blue collar workers—such as 
farm workers, construction workers, utility repair workers, emergency 
responders, and other outdoor laborers—have a greater risk of exposure 
to climate change-related harms.188 
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Climate change also has the potential to disrupt financial markets.189 
Climate change weather events, like severe droughts or hurricanes, can 
create stranded assets for corporations and increase risk for insurance 
companies.190 If the event is large enough, the manifested risks may not 
be effectively shifted from a company’s financial portfolio, causing 
market-influencing insolvency.191 
C. PROPOSED REQUIREMENTS 
1. A Mandate: Targeted Proxy and ESG Reporting 
Both large and small investors demand more comprehensive ESG 
reporting.192 Both financial and non-financial ESG information is 
becoming more important to investors in evaluating and comparing 
investments.193 The Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) Institute 
conducted a survey of 47,000 analysts and portfolio managers in 2017.194 
The results of the survey found that 73 percent of the respondents take 
ESG issues into account in their investment analysis and decisions.195 The 
three most cited factors limiting the respondents’ organization’s ability to 
use ESG information in investment decisions are “a lack of appropriate 
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quantitative ESG information, a lack of comparability across firms, and 
questionable data quality or lack of assurance.”196 
A group of the largest public investors in 2017, including state 
treasurers, public pension funds, unions, legal experts and ESG reporting 
advocates petitioned the SEC “to promptly initiate rule-making to 
develop mandatory rules for public companies to disclose high-quality, 
comparable, decision-useful [ESG] information.”197 The group 
emphasized that standardized disclosure is critical for evaluating 
companies’ long-term performance and risk management.198 They stated 
that while some companies voluntarily disclose, varying reporting 
methods make it difficult for investors to compare companies or rely on 
the information for their investment decisions.199 
Larry Fink, the Chairman and CEO of BlackRock—currently the 
world’s largest asset manager with $5.98 trillion in assets under 
management—is an important voice on the issue.200 He continually 
advocates for the largest companies to disclose their ESG risks given a 
changing landscape that requires more disclosure from the investing 
public.201 In his 2019 Letter to CEOs, he emphasized that with the world 
undergoing the largest transfer of wealth in history, trillions of dollars 
transferring hands from baby boomers to millennials, ESG matters will 
be increasingly material to corporate valuations.202 He emphasized that 
BlackRock focuses its resources on increasing the accuracy and breadth 
of its analytics for measuring ESG factors, helping its clients implement 
similar systems and thereby providing a model for other corporations.203 
Fink further emphasized the financial necessity for increased ESG metrics 
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and disclosure, as “stakeholders [will] reap rewards over the long-term . . 
. and [c]ompanies that ignore them stumble and fail.”204 
Exxon Mobil has felt the pressure of investors to disclose more 
comprehensive ESG metrics.205 In December 2018, Exxon Mobil 
shareholders issued a resolution to set GHG emissions reduction targets, 
which is the first of its kind at Exxon Mobil.206 The resolution suggests 
reduction targets in line with the Paris Climate agreement.207 The effort 
was led by New York State Comptroller, Thomas DiNapoli, as a trustee 
of the New York State Common Retirement Fund, and the Church of 
England’s investment fund.208 Other large investors support the 
resolution, including the California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System, HSBC Global Asset Management, Presbyterian Church USA, 
and Fonds de Solidarité des Travailleurs du Québec.209 The resolution was 
developed with the Climate Action 100+, a global initiative with 310 
investors and more than $32 trillion assets under management.210 Other 
large oil companies, like Royal Dutch Shell (Shell), also face growing 
investor pressure.211 
Given pressure from a significant portion of the world’s largest 
investors, this Note proposes a mandated GHG emissions reduction 
framework and required quarterly reporting of accurate climate change-
related internal data. The proposal seeks to standardize all GHG emissions 
climate change reporting, rather than varied, non-standardized ESG 
reporting and proxy costs that are currently being used by corporations.212 
The CCRF does not specify rules for the calculation of GHG emissions,213 
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therefore, the proposed regulation mandates the use of the GHG Protocol 
developed by the World Resources Institute (WRI) and the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) as the GHG 
emissions accounting methodology.214 The WRI and WBCSD have 
created many easy-to-use tools to calculate corporate emissions.215 
Among Fortune 500 companies, 92 percent of companies responding to 
the Climate Disclosure Project used GHG Protocol directly or indirectly 
through a program based on GHG Protocol.216 GHG Protocol provides the 
accounting platform for virtually every type of corporate GHG emissions 
reporting program in the world.217 
The ESG reporting mandate, alongside the GHG emissions reduction 
target, will serve as a climate change “stress test” within the proposed 
regulatory framework.  The “stress test” will provide the markets with 
more accurate and comprehensive data.218 Better disclosure makes 
markets more efficient219 and also serves to deter fraudulent conduct.220 
Much like Dodd-Frank’s requirement for the FSOC and the Federal 
Reserve to conduct regular stress tests for SIFIs to mitigate potential risk, 
periodic disclosure within a regulatory reduction framework serves the 
same end.221 
Instead of relying on prospectus information, voluntary disclosure, 
or internal documentation, the New York Attorney General, other 
prosecutors, and the investing public can rely on comprehensive quarterly 
disclosures for more accurate information.222 They can compare this 
information to their own findings—whether through investigative means 
or through third party analysts and independent sources—to find any 
evidence of inaccurate or fraudulent information.223 This will serve to 
make disclosure easier to use, and evidence of fraud or inaccurate or 
misstated information easier to find.224 Additionally, the proposal may 
have the effect of creating more securities fraud liability through material 
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misstatements for corporations, given the comprehensiveness required in 
the disclosures.225 This is not to punish, but to create a more transparent 
and accountable environment. The proposal seeks deterrence through 
enhanced disclosure and litigation risk. 
The enhanced GHG emissions and climate change disclosure 
framework developed by this proposal may only be mandated for 
companies that emit more than a certain threshold of GHG. However, 
since it is not a required practice to disclose GHG emissions, it would be 
necessary to first require the disclosure before implementing a 
threshold.226 The threshold would serve to eliminate unnecessary cost and 
effort spent on disclosure on businesses whose operations would not 
significantly contribute to climate change. An initial proposed threshold 
could be around 10,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide per year, based on 
data from utilities and oil producers compared to smaller corporate 
entities.227 For comparison, a typical passenger vehicle emits about 4.6 
metric tons of carbon dioxide per year.228 Once a company passes beyond 
the threshold, disclosure would be required. 
By requiring specific disclosure on GHG emissions, investors will 
be better equiped to mitigate climate change-related risks in their portfolio 
through diversification, and companies will be deterred from using the 
lack of mandatory reporting for financial gain from greater valuation than 
may exist.229 Mandatory social reporting also reduces strategic disclosure 
and gaming of reporting, which involves the voluntary disclosure of 
portions of ESG data to avoid inquiry about other data, or to provide 
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general, non-helpful ESG data to investors.230 Mandatory disclosure also 
requires fiduciaries to act in a socially-responsible manner.231 
Furthermore, it already exists in other contexts.232 
Dodd-Frank contains a “conflict minerals” provision.233 This 
provision requires reporting companies to disclose to the SEC their 
internal measures to exercise due diligence and chain of custody of 
minerals mined in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or adjacent 
countries which have historically been linked to civil strife, human rights 
abuses, and violence.234 The human rights impact of conflict minerals 
directly and indirectly involves business.235 For example, local mining 
companies and their security providers are directly involved in human 
rights abuses such as forced labor.236 Further, an array of companies—
both locally based and multi-national—that buy, trade, transport, process, 
and finance the purchase of conflict minerals may fund and thereby 
perpetuate the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.237 
Dodd-Frank’s conflicts provision seeks to restrict funding sources 
for armed groups in the Congo through the dissemination of information 
about the connection between their commercial activity and human rights 
violations.238 Targeted climate change disclosure seeks to eliminate 
externalized harms similarly stemming from business practices.239 
However, the conflicts provision does not have a remedy for non-
compliance.240 It solely relies on the reputational effects of non-
compliance.241 
This proposal, however, contains monetary, enhanced oversight, and 
divestiture remedies. Rather than focusing on the passive means of 
reputational deterrence, these remedies serve to directly and actively deter 
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continued non-compliance. The proposal’s focus on direct, severe 
sanction mechanisms seeks to create a regime of greater corporate 
compliance.242 Additionally, mandatory climate change ESG disclosure 
will also aid investors and corporations in calculating related reputational 
risks.243 
Corporations are aware of the risks to their brands from adverse 
human rights, environmental, and labor impacts in their supply chains.244 
Additionally, specific disclosure may complement reputational harm by 
making violations of social norms related to climate change more 
unambiguous, as they will be codified in law. 
One objection is that it suggests that adverse social impacts can be 
quantified.245 Risk, it is argued, is itself defined by societal and political 
norms that define what type of events create “risk” in the first place.246 
However, as reputational risks include an estimation of how these risks 
affect the business and its valuation, the challenge of quantification 
should not count out its beneficial societal and market-transparent effect. 
2. Proposal: Stress Test 
The specific proposal follows the December 3, 2018 commitments 
made by Royal Dutch Shell.247 Shell agreed to commit to a 50 percent 
reduction in GHG emissions, with an interim commitment of 20 percent 
by 2035.248 Shell also committed to setting three- or five-year periodic 
goals to meet both interim and final commitments.249 Shell’s long-term 
reduction commitments are the highest of any other large company in the 
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oil and gas sector.250 The commitment includes Scope 1 and 2 emissions, 
which are the direct emission from company operations, and emissions 
from energy use by the company, respectively.251 
However, Shell also committed its Scope 3 emissions, which include 
any emissions from the corporation’s products or supply-stream.252 Scope 
3 is the most expansive, as it also accounts for emissions from the use of 
the fossil fuels sold by Shell.253 The proposal adopts Shell’s interim and 
long-term reduction commitment—including Scope 1, 2, and 3 
emissions—to all disclosing companies above 10 metric tons of carbon 
dioxide per year.254 
The proposal has consequences for non-compliance to target 
reduction similar to those of non-compliance for non-bank SIFIs. Dodd-
Frank permits the FSOC to recommend participating agencies to force an 
over-leveraged, systemically compromising company to divest assets or 
dissolve.255 For example, if the proposal starts in 2020, once a disclosing 
company is deemed non-compliant at either the 15 (2035) or 30-year 
(2050) target, the SEC, with the EPA’s guidance, would issue monetary 
penalties and provide recommendations for reduction. If further non-
compliance occurs over the course of the next five-year target cycle, the 
SEC and EPA could force the divestiture of non-compliant assets or 
divisions. 
As the FSOC’s administrative reasoning must include an analysis of 
cost, so does the proposal.256 The analysis of cost must be “appropriate” 
and consider “risk-related” factors, which include systemic risk and 
insolvency risk compared to the regulatory cost imposed on the 
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company.257 Given the significant and systemic climate-related risks to 
the national economy and vulnerable populations of continued GHG 
emissions,258 the proposal would be an appropriate regulation, as the risks 
it addresses outweigh the regulatory burden of a 30-year emissions target 
and disclosure regime. The proposal also considers “risk-related” factors, 
as it takes into account an adequate timeframe—30 years—to 
significantly reduce the corporation’s emissions. The weight of economic 
and societal harm outweighs the harm of any one corporation’s reduction 
in emissions over the course of 30 years. 
The proposal’s general requirements follow the CCRF and GHG 
Protocol.259 Disclosures must include a strategic analysis of risk and 
governance.260 This includes “[m]anagement’s view of the extent to which 
the organization’s strategy and operational performance are affected by 
climate change-related risks and opportunities . . . .”261 Disclosures must 
also include governance processes for addressing those effects, which 
provides vital information for investors and decision-makers in assessing 
the condition of the organization.262 
The CCRF additionally mandates information about the future 
outlook and any uncertainties or key dependencies related to climate 
change and a company’s business.263 This information is decision-useful 
when it (a) describes long-term strategic developments that may enhance 
opportunities or increase risk, such as organic growth or decline, 
acquisitions or divestments and operational changes; (b) includes 
estimates of investment in or the cost of GHG emissions abatement or 
climate change adaptation that could materially affect the growth, future 
earnings and the direction of the organization; (c) includes an estimate of 
future movements in direct and indirect GHG emissions, taking account 
of expected GHG emissions, energy efficiency, and reduction plans; and 
(d) estimates any cost savings associated with GHG emissions abatement 
and energy efficiency expectations.264 
For the specific GHG emissions reporting information, both the 
CCRF and GHG Protocol mandate the inclusion of movements in GHG 
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emissions results over time, along with a description of activities that 
caused them and the reasons behind them.265 In terms of the target 
emission reduction, both the CCRF and GHG Protocol require 
information that, in order to be decision-useful, (a) specifies the GHG 
emissions reduction activities and sources; (b) describes the activities and 
investments required to achieve the plans and any risks or limiting factors 
that might affect achievement of the plans and targets; (c) analyzes 
progress to date against previously set plans or targets; and (d) analyzes 
progress against regional, national, international, or sectoral targets.266 
3. Community Stakeholders as Recognized by the Market and the Law 
Corporations widely recognize their effect on community 
stakeholders.267 One such company is Swiss Re, a large reinsurance 
company that has been at the forefront of recognizing climate change as 
a threat to its business.268 Swiss Re has stated its “actions are based on the 
premise that it is in the interest of shareholders, clients and employees, 
the wider stakeholder community and society in general to tackle this 
[climate change] issue.”269 
Many energy companies also understand the need to incorporate the 
wider community, as their business is intertwined with the community.270 
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Companies speak of their community engagement through volunteering, 
charity, employment and education opportunities, and economic 
development of surrounding communities.271 Exxon Mobil has addressed 
its direct community engagement on environmental issues through 
effective community wastewater solutions.272 Furthermore, the law 
recognizes community stakeholders.273 
In banking, Dodd-Frank requires enhanced regulatory oversight for 
SIFIs, as their insolvency would cause societal harm.274 The communities 
affected, low-income and vulnerable populations, and the greater working 
public are recognized by the law.275 In securities law, the SEC recently 
revised its mining disclosure regulations to include engagement and study 
of the interests of agencies, non-governmental organizations, 
communities, and other stakeholders as required items to be disclosed 
under a pre-feasibility or feasibility study of a mining project.276 The SEC 
defended its inclusion of these disclosure requirements, stating “[w]e 
believe that the inclusion of . . . [these] risks . . . [is] necessary because 
factors such as environmental regulatory compliance, the ability to obtain 
necessary permits, and other legal challenges can directly impact the 
economic viability of a mining project.”277 
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The Delaware Supreme Court ruled that boards of directors can 
consider other stakeholder interests during takeover negotiations.278 Many 
other states have corporate “stakeholder laws” that allow the 
consideration of surrounding communities or society when making 
business decisions.279 Some states, such as Wyoming, even mandate 
societal consideration for the board in business decisions.280 
4. Proposal: Fair Fund 
This Note argues for an adoption of the use of the SEC’s fair funds 
authority. The proposal uses this authority as a legal mechanism of 
compensating climate change-related remediation, mitigation, and 
cleanup efforts, with a focus on vulnerable groups. Much like Dodd-
Frank’s SIFI liquidity requirement that essentially creates an internally 
managed fund to safeguard from external harms or systemic failure, the 
fair fund mechanism is an externally managed fund used to remedy 
internal parties or stakeholders.281 
This proposal instead seeks to use fair funds to remedy external 
harms. As the SEC’s primary goal is to protect investors and safeguard 
the public interest by ensuring that capital markets are “fair, orderly, and 
efficient,” fair funds tailored for remedying the external, environmental 
harm created by market activity help in achieving this goal.282 
Sarbanes-Oxley authorizes the SEC to add civil fines paid in 
enforcement actions to disgorgement funds, which are called “fair funds,” 
and distribute funds to the victims of securities violations.283 The decision 
to distribute these funds to investors is at the discretion of the SEC or, 
upon the SEC’s motion, the court, in cases in which the SEC brings suit 
against the defendant.284 At the time the SEC recommends a negotiated 
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settlement or to initiate litigation, it must also consider whether to propose 
the creation of a fair fund:285 
The SEC’s ultimate decision to distribute collected funds depends 
largely on two factors: whether there is an identifiable class of investor 
victims who suffered an identifiable harm, and whether the amount of 
money likely to be collected from the defendant is large enough to 
justify a distribution given the number of potential victims.286 
However, fair funds have also been subject to the circularity critique, 
especially in cases that involve fraudulent disclosures by public 
companies.287 In these cases, management overstates the company’s 
performance, pushing up its stock price.288 However, unless the firm 
issues new stock or trades in its own stock during the period of 
overstatement, its gain from the misrepresentation is minimal.289 When 
the firm is forced to pay the penalty, its current shareholders are then 
forced to bear the costs of that penalty, even though many of those same 
shareholders suffered losses from the fraud.290 
Therefore, for large corporate securities fraud, the proposal suggests 
fair fund distribution to externally harmed, vulnerable communities as a 
better allocation of resources to remedy the harm. External distribution 
would avoid stakeholders bearing the cost of securities fraud settlements 
through costs to the corporation when they are an innocent party.291 
Dispersal to mitigation, remediation, and cleanup efforts would serve to 
create a net benefit to society, rather than a zero sum or net loss through 
circular dispersal.292 
Fair funds also allow dispersal to the government if the SEC 
determines investors cannot be successfully or practically reimbursed.293 
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The majority of sums collected for fair funds since its adoption were 
deposited in the U.S. Treasury’s General Fund for this reason.294 The 
proposal would not get rid of the option to contribute to the U.S. Treasury, 
as it is still a net gain and can be used in mitigation, remediation, and 
clean-up efforts.295 However, the most direct benefit would be direct 
application of the fair fund for these efforts to low-income, vulnerable 
communities affected by climate change.296 
5. Recommendation to Regulators and Prosecutors 
As traditional securities remedies suffer from circularity, it is 
important for prosecutors—both federal and state—to bring cases that 
externalize remedies.297 Externalized remedies can be general or 
specific.298 General externalized remedies take the form of disgorged or 
sanctioned payments to the federal or state government.299 In the fair fund 
context, the SEC sends disgorged or sanctioned amounts—which cannot 
be effectively allocated to investors—to the Treasury.300 Payments to the 
government can be used to effectuate the remedying of external harms—
as in the climate change context—including mitigation, adaptation, and 
cleanup efforts for vulnerable populations. The specific remedies in this 
context take the form of payment directly to the EPA for remediation, 
mitigation, and adaptation programs from the fair fund, as pursuant to this 
proposal. 
Therefore, the proposal recommends a larger, “public class counsel” 
role for the SEC and state prosecutors to take on this type of fraud.301 This 
public class counsel role increases an agency’s focus on remedying public 
harms through seeking litigation that recoups harm caused and best deters 
the conduct.302 In many instances, the SEC and other enforcement 
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agencies already choose cases seeking deterrent effects.303 Yet, in terms 
of the SEC, the agency has been reluctant to use the fair funds provision 
to its full potential as a targeted remedial device, choosing instead to 
recoup money directly to the U.S. Treasury.304 Nevertheless, by bringing 
cases that seek external remedies, whether through the fair funds device 
or through sanctions paid to the government, the securities laws can be an 
effective remedial and deterrence mechanism of climate change-related 
fraud. 
CONCLUSION 
Circularity in remedy, lack of mandatory disclosure, and the 
challenge of quantifying proxy cost render using securities fraud an 
ineffective mechanism to combat climate change. In order to effectuate 
more transparent markets and a carbon accountable society, this Note 
proposes a regulatory solution. 
The proposal is modeled from Dodd-Frank as a stakeholder, and 
externally focused law. The proposal has three mechanisms: enhanced 
disclosure, GHG emissions reduction, and fair funds. The first two 
mechanisms will provide the markets with more accurate and 
comprehensive data, thereby resulting in more efficient markets. The 
mechanisms working together also serve to deter fraudulent conduct 
through litigation risk. The last mechanism, fair funds, serves to capture 
the external harm left uncaptured by traditional remedies through 
dispersal to vulnerable communities most affected by climate change. 
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